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Research on the Production and Collusion Supervision of Green Agricultural Products Based on the Perspective of Stochastic Evolutionary Games Theory

《北方园艺》[ISSN:1001-0009/CN:23-1247/S]

Issue:
2024年11
Page:
119-126
Research Field:
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Research on the Production and Collusion Supervision of Green Agricultural Products Based on the Perspective of Stochastic Evolutionary Games Theory
Author(s):
LIU Qiyou; LIN Liting; ZHANG Chengke
(School of Economics,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510520)
Keywords:
supervision of green agricultural products; collusive rent-seeking; evolutionary game
PACS:
F 274
DOI:
10.11937/bfyy.20233864
Abstract:
Considering the government′s supervision of green agricultural product safety production,the collusion between agricultural enterprises and third-party testing institutions in rent seeking has led to the frequent occurrence of ‘pseudo green’ products on the market.This study introduced Gaussian white noise as a random interference term and constructs a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model for government regulatory departments,agricultural enterprises,and third-party testing institutions in green production and quality supervision.On this basis,numerical simulation analysis was conducted to explore the effects of random disturbance factors,government rewards and punishments,and other factors on the selection of strategies and the convergence rate of evolution to a stable state for each agent.Finally,relevant policies and suggestions were proposed based on the numerical simulation results,in order to provide reference for the current production and regulation of green food.

References:

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Last Update: 2024-07-01