|Table of Contents|

Effect of Subsidy Policy for Converting Farmland to Forestry on Game Behavior Between Farmers and Governments

《北方园艺》[ISSN:1001-0009/CN:23-1247/S]

Issue:
2019年11
Page:
152-157
Research Field:
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Effect of Subsidy Policy for Converting Farmland to Forestry on Game Behavior Between Farmers and Governments
Author(s):
WU Zijing1; LIU Simeng2
(1.School of Government Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871;2.College of Agriculture,Guangxi University,Nanning,Guangxi 53004)
Keywords:
Converting Farmland to Forestry; ecological compensation; dynamic game
PACS:
-
DOI:
10.11937/bfyy.20183506
Abstract:
The Converting Farmland to Forestry Projection is an ecological construction project with strong public attributes.Its project income takes into account long-term social benefits such as ecological and environmental benefits rather than current vested economic benefits.As the main actors of the project,the farmers and the government have different demands for the benefits of the project,which makes the government mainly use administrative subsidies to achieve the purpose of ecological protection.According to the game relationship between farmers and the government,subsidies,as an incentive means,must meet certain standards in terms of quantity and form,and have adaptability to local conditions in order to enable subsidies to achieve their functions.Therefore,the subsidy system of Converting Farmland to Forestry should not be unified.It is suggested to improve the existing subsidy methods,combine the subsidy with the supervision and punishment mechanism,and establish a subsidy system of Converting Farmland to Forestry according to local conditions.

References:

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Last Update: 2019-07-11