|Table of Contents|

Quality Input of Edible Fungi Based on Evolutionary Game

《北方园艺》[ISSN:1001-0009/CN:23-1247/S]

Issue:
2018年07
Page:
193-198
Research Field:
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Quality Input of Edible Fungi Based on Evolutionary Game
Author(s):
XU Yaoqun; YU Qijia
(School of Management,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin,Heilongjiang 150028)
Keywords:
evolutionary game; edible fungi; quality input
PACS:
-
DOI:
10.11937/bfyy.20172836
Abstract:
The edible fungi has high nutritional value and obvious competitive advantages.The evolutionary game model of edible fungi quality investment between suppliers and processors was established and solved because of the problem that the level of edible fungi preservation and processing technology was not high in China.The results showed that the most important factor which influences edible fungi quality investment strategy of suppliers and processors was the proportion of quality investment between the two sides.The evolutionary equilibrium would produce multiple states when the proportion of quality investment changes.Both sides would had high motivation to invest in edible fungi quality when its input-output ratio was relatively large and then the quality of edible fungi could be effectively improved at the same time.

References:

 

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Last Update: 2018-04-23